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will be available to most small tract owners. To qualify for the
special allowable, one must prove that surrounding landowners have
refused to pool on reasonable terms-a rather unlikely occurrence
except under very special circumstances. The larger tract owners,
in most instances, undoubtedly will be more than willing to pool
on a reasonable basis with the small tract owners to prevent the
drainage that can result if the latter is given a special allowable
large enough to permit a profit. As the dissent points out, this case
and resulting field rules represent a policy approaching a non-
statutory compulsory pooling requirement. 8 No one will be forced
to pool, but of course in most situations economic pressures will
leave small tract owners no real alternative. Prior to this case, a
portion of the minerals belonging to large tract owners were con-
fiscated to prevent total confiscation, sometimes due to a refusal to
pool, of minerals underlying a small tract. Under the new policy,
if a pooling agreement is reached, nothing will be confiscated, but
each owner will receive his fair share of the minerals in the common
reservoir. The extreme inequities presented by the Commission's
original order were perhaps necessary to point up the need for a new
policy. The Texas Legislature has long declined to enact a com-
pulsory pooling statute. If legislation now is forthcoming, it is
hoped that the purpose would be only to clarify, or at most modify,
and not to change the result of this case, which represents a trend
toward more orderly and equitable development of the oil and gas
fields of the states. The holding here is important and desirable not
only as affecting correlative rights between landowners, but as pro-
moting conservation and the general economy of the state's petro-
leum industry.
Thomas A. Howeth
Embezzled Funds: Taxable Income
in the Year of Misappropriation
Petitioner was a union official who, during the years 1951
through 1954, embezzled over 738,000 dollars from his union
and from an insurance company with which the union was doing
business. He failed to report these amounts in his gross income in
those years and was convicted for willfully attempting to evade
the federal income tax due for each of the years 1951 through 1954
"8 See quotation note 49 supra.
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in violation of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which
make such conduct felonious.1 The court of appeals affirmed the
conviction.! The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
because of the apparent similarity between these facts and those in
Commissioner v. Wilcox.' In the latter case the Court had decided
that embezzled funds did not constitute a taxable gain. Held: Wil-
cox is overruled; embezzled funds constitute a gain to the em-
bezzler which must be reported as gross income for federal income
tax purposes in the year of the misappropriation. James v. United
States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
The sixteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States makes no attempt to define income. It gives Congress the
broad "power to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever
source derived."' Congress first undertook to exercise this power
through the Income Tax Act of October 3, 1913, when it defined
income in Section II B of that act: "[T]he net income of a taxable
person shall include gains, profits, and income derived from .. .
the transaction of any lawful business carried on for gain or profit,
or gains or profits and income from any source whatever."' The word
"lawful" was dropped when the statute was amended in 1916.'
Although Congress added other amendments to the various income
defining provisions,' it made only one change in wording of any
major significance when it adopted the Internal Revenue Code of
TInt. Rev. Code of 1939, § 145(b) and Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7201. Both sections
are applicable because of the years involved; however, there are no substantial differences
between the two.
2273 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1959).
a 327 U.S. 404 (1946). In his capacity as bookkeeper, the taxpayer had embezzled several
thousand dollars from his employer. The company never condoned the taking, but held him
liable to return the misappropriated funds. He was unable to do so, having lost most of
the money in various gambling houses in Reno. The taxpayer was convicted of embezzlement
and sentenced to serve two to fourteen years in prison.
4 Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the judgment of the court in an opinion in which
Justices Stewart and Brehnan concurred. They felt that although the Petitioner should have
paid taxes on the embezzled funds, the element of willfulness, which is required for income
tax evasion convictions, could not be proven in this case "so long as the statute contained
the gloss placed upon it by Wilcox at the time the alleged crime was committed." 366 U.S.
at 221. Justices Harlan, Frankfurter, and Clark agreed that Wilcox should be overruled, but
did not concur with the court's reversal of the conviction as a matter of law. Justices Black,
Douglas, and Whittaker believed that Wilcox was still correct and that the Petitioner should
not be convicted because, in their opinion, he owed no tax on the misappropriated funds.
Hence, the highly divided court (there were five separate opinions) found little common
ground for deciding the fate of the Petitioner. More important for the present discussion,
however, is the fact that six justices did agree that Wilcox was incorrect and should be
overruled.
'Montgomery, Federal Taxes 11 (37th ed. 1958).
'Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II B, 38 Stat. 167. (Emphasis added.)
7Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 757.
'By the time of the adoption of the 1939 Code, "net income" had become "gross
income" and there was a special section devoted to the definition of that term. Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, 5 22(a).
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1954. That version states simply that "[G]ross income means all
income from whatever source derived. . . "' The broadening trend
in the concept of gross income, as manifested by the statutory defini-
tions, has been borne out in the courts."° This same trend is found
in the realm of illegal transactions. The Supreme Court in United
States v. Sullivan" paid particular attention to the omission of the
"lawful" requirement from the gross income definition in the 1916
Act. The Court, by declaring bootlegging profits taxable, finally
resolved any doubts entertained by the lower courts concerning the
taxability of income because it was illegally obtained." In a series
of cases decided over the past thirty-five years, in opinions rendered
at every level from the Tax Court to the Supreme Court, the principle
has become firmly established that income obtained from illegal
businesses"3 and acquired through most illegal transactions4 is taxable.
slot. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61(a). This section is based upon the language found in
the sixteenth amendment and seems to indicate the legislative intent to exercise the taxa-
tion power to its fullest extent. For a general legislative history of this section see U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 4802 (1954).
"oSpeaking of the word "income" in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918), Mr. Justice
Holmes said, "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances
and the time in which it is used." Id. at 425. For a graphic illustration of this changing
concept compare Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), with Commissioner v. Glen-
shaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
The statutory definition of "gross income" was under consideration in Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), when the court stated, "The broad sweep of this language
indicates the purpose of Congress to use the full measure of its taxing power ....
Hence our construction of the statute should be consonant with that purpose." Id. at 334.
" 274 U.S. 259 (1927). After taking note of the deletion, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking
for a unanimous court, stated, "We see no reason . . . why the fact that a business is
unlawful should exempt it from paying the taxes that if lawful it would have to pay. Id.
at 263.
aa E.g., the concurring opinion of Manton, J., in Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d
564, 569 (2d Cir. 1926): "It is incredible to believe that it was intended that a boot-
legger be dignified as a taxpayer for his illegal profit, so that the government may accept
his money for governmental purposes, as it accepts the money of the honest merchant
taxpayer."
1 E.g., United States v. Chapman, 168 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
853 (1948) (black market operations); Barker v. Magruder, 95 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1938)
(usurious loans); Paterson v. Anderson, 20 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (unlawful
insurance policies); George L. Rickard, 15 B.T.A. 316 (1929) (illegal prize fight pic-
tures); Mary Luginbuhl, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 968 (1949) (abortion racket).
14E.g., Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952) (extortion); Johnson v. United
States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943) (protection racket); Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d
340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 637 (1942) (ransom payment); Christian H.
Droge, 35 B.T.A. 829 (1937) (lottery). For further compilation of these activities and
cases see Note, 30 Ind. L.J. 487 (1955); Comment, 38 Marq. L. Rev. 262, 263 (1955);
Comment, 13 U. Miami L. Rev. 359 (1959); Note, 62 Yale L.J. 662 (1953). For a good
general discussion of the problem see Annot., 166 A.L.R. 891 (1947); Geller & Rogers,
How the Federal Income Tax Applies to Illegal and Unlawful Gains, 27 Taxes 214 (1949).
It is interesting to note, however, that the cases do not purport to establish any universal
test to determine tax liability. An early case, James P. McKenna, 1 B.T.A. 326 (1925),
held that "a wrongdoer will not be heard to urge his own wrongdoing . . . in bar of
rights of third parties, and this is equally true when such third party is the Federal
Government seeking to assert a tax .... .. " Later, in Griffith v. Smith, 101 F.2d 348
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The notable exceptions to the general rule of taxability were the
gains acquired by embezzlement'5 and possibly theft.6 Prior to the
Wilcox case, the circuit courts could not agree on the taxability of
embezzled funds. That inconsistency was the reason given by the
Supreme Court for granting certiorari in Wilcox. In an opinion
which subsequently has received substantial judicial attention as well
as extensive treatment by legal writers, the Court specifically stated
that the money received by an embezzler through his crime was not
taxable." Further, the Court established a basis for taxability which
was unknown prior to this decision." It was held that:
a taxable gain is conditioned upon (1) the presence of a claim of right
to the alleged gain and (2) the absence of a definite, unconditional
obligation to repay or return that which would otherwise constitute
a gain. Without some bona fide legal or equitable claim, even though
it be contingent or contested in nature, the taxpayer cannot be said to
have received any gain or profit within the reach of Section 22 (a)."
(7th Cir. 1938), the circuit court of appeals spoke in terms of "legal title" and held
that corporate officers who had received excessive bonuses, voidable at the instance of
the stockholders, must pay taxes on the money received because the "legal title" had passed
from the corporation to the officers. The "claim of right" doctrine of Commissioner v.
Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946), and the "control and benefit" theory of Rutkin v. United
States, supra, will be discussed in detail in the text infra.
's Commissioner v. Wilcox, supra note 14.
lsSteinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564, 566 (2d Cir. 1926) (dictum). See also
Note, 30 Ind. L.J. 487, 488 (1955): "Proceeds from larceny have never been considered
subject to taxation as income for a simple, practical reason. If the thief was apprehended,
the property was returned to the victim. If the criminal escaped, the Government did
not know on whom to levy the tax."17 For taxability: Kurrle v. Helvering, 126 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1942). The court
followed the general trend of cases up to that time which had taxed funds held by the
taxpayer, even though they were returned at a later time. For non-taxability: McKnight
v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1942). Here the court compared the embezzler
to a borrower and the employer to a lender. Although the borrower/embezzler has the
use and control of the money it still rightfully belongs to the lender/employer. The fact
that the United States might get a preferential claim to the money, to the direct loss
and detriment of the rightful owner also seemed important to the court. Id. at 574.
is 327 U.S. at 406.
Is Id. at 409.
20 While the "claim of right" doctrine, as such, was not new, its use in Wilcox was new.
It was applied there to determine whether a gain was taxable. The doctrine was first men-
tioned in North Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932):
If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction
as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required to return,
even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money,
and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent.
But that case dealt with when income became taxable, not whether it was taxable. Some
earlier cases had held that the recipient of illegally derived funds had a claim of right,
hence taxable income. E.g., Kurrle v. Helvering, 126 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1942). Yet in other
cases the wrongdoer was held to have no claim of right to the money and the courts still
found that the funds constituted taxable income. E.g., Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125
F.2d 340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 637 (1942).
21327 U.S. at 408. The Court did note the broad statutory language of § 22(a) of
the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, but at the same time stated that mere dominion over money
or property is not decisive in all cases. "In fact, no single, conclusive criterion has yet been
found to determine in all situations what is sufficient gain to support the imposition of an
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Some years later the Court confronted a very similar problem in
Rutkin v. United States," a case involving the taxability of extorted
funds. The taxpayer unsuccessfully contended that Wilcox was
authority for the proposition that such funds should be exempt from
taxation. The voidable title obtained by the extortionist and the
fact that this title would probably never be assailed by the victim
seemed to the majority to be reason enough to distinguish this from
the embezzlement situation." Mr. Justice Black wrote a vigorous
dissent in which he objected to the rationale of the majority on the
ground that it was in effect rejecting the basis for the Wilcox case."'
The Court had, in fact, vitiated the Wilcox holding by establishing
a new test of taxability." Under the Rutkin test a gain "constitutes
taxable income when its recipient has such control over it that, as
a practical matter, he derives readily realizable economic value from
it."" There is no requirement for a "claim of right," or for the
"absence of an unconditional duty to repay" in order for there to
be a taxable gain. Unfortunately, Wilcox was not overruled and
was declared to be controlling in cases with a similar set of facts."7
This situation led to several unsuccessful attempts to plead embezzle-
ment as a defense in tax evasion cases," and to a number of interesting
opinions in which the differentiation in fact situations was tenuous,
income tax. No more can be said in general than that all relevant facts and circumstances
must be considered." Id. at 407. As in the McKnight case, 127 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1942),
the Court stated that the debtor-creditor relationship between the taxpayer and his em-
ployer was definite and unconditional as of the time of the misappropriation. "All right,
title and interest in the money rested with the employer." 327 U.S. at 409. In Wilcox the
embezzler had no claim of right to the money upon which a tax claim could be based. At
the end of the majority opinion, the Court added another significant reason for its holding.
"Sanctioning a tax under the circumstances before us would serve only to give the United
States an unjustified preference as to part of the money which rightfully and completely
belongs to the taxpayer's employer." Id. at 410.
2 343 U.S. 130 (1952). The taxpayer had obtained $250,000 from his victim through
threats upon the life of the victim and his family. He failed to report this income and was
convicted for income tax evasion. In an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Burton, the lone
dissenter in Wilcox, the majority upheld the conviction. The reasoning of the Court was
substantially the same as that used by Mr. Justice Burton in his earlier dissent.
23 d. at 136-37.24 Id. at 140.
2 See United States v. Bruswitz, 219 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1955):
It is difficult to perceive what, if anything, is left of the Wilcox holding after
Rutkin v. United States. . . . Certainly the whole approach of the later case,
stressing actual possession and control, is diametrically opposed to the "claim
of right" criterion of the earlier case.
2" 3 4 3 U.S. at 137 (1952).
27 Id. at 138.
2SE.g., Davis v. United States, 226 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 965(1956); Kann v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967(1954). Both cases involved closely held corporations where the officers claimed to have
embezzled the funds taken by them from the corporation. The courts refused to be deceived
by what appeared to be nothing more than a tax dodge. But cf. J. J. Dix, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 223 F,2d 436 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 894 (1955).
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if not questionable."9 The stage was set for the Supreme Court to
consider the question once again.
In overruling Wilcox the Court in the instant case stated,
"[E]xamination of the reasoning used in Rutkin leads us inescapably
to the conclusion that Wilcox was thoroughly devitalized. 30 In his
opinion Mr. Chief Justice Warren compared the facts and holdings
of the two cases and pointed out the practical inconsistencies be-
tween the two tests for determining tax liability. Furthermore he
said that:
it is inconsequential that an embezzler may lack title to the sums he
appropriates while an extortionist may gain a voidable title. Questions
of federal taxation are not determined by such "attenuated sub-
tleties." . . . Likewise unimportant is the fact that the sufferer of an
extortion is less likely to seek restitution than one whose funds are
embezzled."1
In the absence of these two points, Wilcox and Rutkin are indis-
tinguishable. The Court chose to adopt the Rutkin rationale, thereby
making control of the property, and the benefits derived from that
control, decisive. The origin of the criteria in that case can be traced
"9E.g., Briggs v. United States, 214 F.2d 699 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 864
(1954); Marienfeld v. United States, 214 F.2d 632 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 865
(1954). In the Briggs case, the taxpayer was authorized by his company to take bids on
land which the company wished to sell. With the help of his co-defendant, Briggs, the tax-
payer pocketed the difference between the price paid to him and that which he reported to
his employer. Both defendants then invested the money in a real estate venture, realizing a
substantial gain. Upon learning of the income tax evasion prosecution, the company sought
and obtained restitution from the defendants. The court distinguished this case from Wilcox
on the ground that Wilcox had lost all the money which he took from his employer, while
in the Briggs case the taxpayers were still solvent and had repaid the funds taken by them.
The court felt that there was even less similarity between the Wilcox case and the situation
of Briggs, who, not being an agent of the company, obtained his share through fraud, not
embezzlement. 214 F.2d at 702.
In the Marienfeld case, supra, the Defendant processed meat products for Stokely-Van
Camp Co. and was authorized to sell these for Stokely. However, he converted a substantial
amount of the products to his own use. The court pointed out that the only distinction
apparent to them between Marienfeld and Wilcox was the fact that in the latter case, the
bookkeeper was under an immediate and unconditional obligation to repay the funds taken
by him, whereas Marienfeld was to hold the proceeds from the sales for Stokely and account
for them at a later time.
It appears that in both cases the defendants would have been guilty of embezzlement
under the applicable local laws; however, the courts refused to consider this point con-
trolling. In the Marienfeld case the court stated specifically that state laws were not decisive
in determining tax liability, even though it noted that the Supreme Court in Wilcox had
relied upon Nevada law to show the taxpayer's duty to repay the funds taken by him.
The instant case, too, can be distinguished from Wilcox on its facts. The Petitioner
would have been liable for a taxable gain even under the latter decision, although not in the
year of the misappropriation. Wilcox did not hold that the funds obtained by embezzlement
were never taxable, just that they were not taxable so long as they still belonged to the
victim. Condonation by or a release from the rightful owner would create income which
would be taxable. The union had settled its claims against James for $13,568.50. According
to the Wilcox decision, the amount unpaid by the taxpayer was income to him at that time.
'366 U.S. at 215.
' Id. at 216.
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back to an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes in Corliss v. Bowers," in
which he concluded that "taxation is not so much concerned with
the refinements of title as it is with actual command over the
property taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax is paid."" Mr.
Justice Cardozo intensified the force of this statement in an opinion
written by him three years later in Burnet v. Wells:'
[The government] may tax not only ownership, but any right or
privilege that is a constituent of ownership. . . . Liability may rest
upon the enjoyment by the taxpayer of privileges and benefits so
substantial and important as to make it reasonable and just to deal
with him as if he were the owner, and to tax him on that basis."
The two previous cases were concerned with whom to tax when
dealing with trusts; nonetheless, the same policy reasons underlying
these decisions are applicable when determining what constitutes a
taxable gain. Administrative convenience and the practical neces-
sities required in order to have an efficient taxing system now seem
to command equal importance when deciding either question."0 At
any rate, the "control and benefit" test is firmly established as the
one which the courts will use in these cases.' The downfall of the
somewhat anomolous Wilcox holding was predictable from the
time it first appeared because it constituted an exception to an almost
universal rule for the taxation of illegally earned income." When
considered in the light of modern judicial pronouncements construing
the definition of gross income, the limits of the constitutional taxing
power," and the meaning of "claim of right"' the present decision
seems correct.
'2281 U.S. 376 (1930).
3Id. at 378. (Emphasis added.)
a4289 U.S. 670 (1933).
"5 Id. at 678. (Emphasis added; citations omitted.)
3' See Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 137 (1952); Corliss v. Bowers, 289 U.S.
670, 678 (1933). As pointed out before, Wilcox did not hold that embezzled funds would
never be taxable. See note 29 supra. One of the main criticisms of that case was that it
merely delayed the collection of the taxes which could later become due. Such a delay
makes administration of the tax difficult and collection less certain. See generally Note, 30
Ind. L.J. 487 (1955); Note, 62 Yale L.J. 662 (1953).
'3 See, e.g., Benes v. United States, 276 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1960); United States v. Brus-
witz, 219 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1955).
"See, e.g., Note, 44 Mich. L. Rev. 885 (1946).
"Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). The Court stated that
it would give a liberal construction to the broad phraseology in the statutory definition of
gross income "in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except those
specifically exempted." Id. at 430.
See also Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 48-49 (1949):
The contrast between the provisions [defining income and listing exemp-
tions] is striking. The income taxed is described in sweeping terms and should
be broadly construed in accordance with an obvious purpose to tax income
comprehensively. The exemptions, on the other hand, are specifically stated
and should be construed with restraint in the light of the same policy.
"'See, e.g., Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953).
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The "claim of right" doctrine, in its original context, was a result
of the annual accounting system of income taxation. The courts
used it to determine when income became taxable. The doctrine
was also adopted by the courts, though to a lesser extent than the
"control and benefit" theory, to determine what constituted a tax-
able gain." However, the Supreme Court in Healy v. Commissioner"
combined the two concepts and stated that when the taxpayer had
the funds in his possession subject to his control and disposition, he
held the funds under a "claim of right." The case was concerned
with when the income should be reported for tax purposes. Thus
the Court correctly applied the "claim of right" doctrine to the
facts to decide when the income was earned. At the same time, it
used the "control and benefit" test to determine whether the income
was in fact taxable and to establish a claim of right even though the
money received by the taxpayer had to be returned at a later date.
There are, then, at least three questions which might arise in
these illegal income cases, or, for that matter, in any case where the
claim to the property is contested:
(1) In what period is the income to be reported? It should be
reported in the period during which the taxpayer acquires it under
a claim of right. The requisite claim of right is established when the
taxpayer treats the income as his own."'
(2) Under what circumstances does a gain constitute taxable in-
come? It becomes taxable when its recipient has such control over it
that, as a practical matter, he derives readily realizable economic
value from it.""
(3) Who should be the taxpayer under these circumstances? One
who is in a position to derive the economic value from the gain
should pay the tax."
The correct application of these criteria will lead to a relatively
simple and uniform method for determining tax liability, which in
turn will promote convenient administration of the tax under the
annual accounting system.
In the Wilcox decision and the Rutkin and James dissents, one of
the primary reasons advanced for nontaxability of embezzled funds
was the fact that the government's tax lien might impair the right-
ful owner's chances of recovering the money taken from him.4" This
41 See note 20 supra.
42345 U.S. 278 (1953).
4 Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953).
44 See the instant case.
4 Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933).
46 This problem was really not before the Court in the instant case because the victim
union had already released its claim against the taxpayer for a fraction of the amount
1962) NOTES
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argument has been considered only one time in any Supreme Court
opinion. Mr. Justice Burton in the Wilcox dissent stated that, at
most, such an argument should be reason for Congress to change the
law, not for the Court to refuse to enforce it." The argument has not
been a deciding factor in any other field of illegal activity, and it
should not be when embezzled funds are involved. The evasion
prosecution brought by the government will normally follow a civil
suit or criminal prosecution arising out of the misappropriation. By
that time the rightful owner will ordinarily have begun proceedings
to recoup his losses. The government's tax lien attaches to the
property of the taxpayer which is not subject to a prior lien." Hence,
the owner will be prejudiced by the government's claim only when
he is unable to identify his property in the hands of the embezzler
and when he has neglected to obtain a prior lien on the property
which the embezzler might own.
The embezzler's repayment of the money taken raises the prob-
lem of his right to take a deduction in that year. It had not been
altogether clear whether Section 1341 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 would be applicable in this type of case."5 In a statement made
as dictum the Court in the instant case seems to recognize that there
may be a reduction of the taxpayer's income "if, when, and to the
extent that the victim recovers back the misappropriated funds ...""
While this would be consistent with the cases which establish the
"control and benefit" doctrine as a basis for taxability, it seems con-
trary to the plain language of the statute. The presence of Section
1341 in the portion of the Internal Revenue Code entitled "Claim
of Right" indicates that the statute was designed to alleviate the
tax burden imposed upon those persons who must pay tax in the
year during which property is acquired under a claim of right and
who later restore a substantial amount of that property. As men-
tioned above, the Supreme Court has equated this claim of right
with control of and benefit from the property so acquired." But
taken. Thus the equities which faced the Court in Wilcox were not present; however, it is
unlikely, under the rationale adopted in the present decision, that the holding would have
been different had there been no release.
"7 327 U.S. 404, 414.
4
sInt. Rev. Code of 1954, 55 6321, 6323.
"' For an excellent discussion of the problem see Note, 30 Ind. L.J. 487, 493-95 (1955).
See also Mertens, Federal Income Taxation §§ 54.10-.12, 54.38-.47 (1958).
"This section provides for a recomputation of the tax upon income which was held
under an "unrestricted right" and which was later given up to someone with a better right.
There had been some doubts expressed concerning the "unrestricted right" of an em-
bezzler to the property taken by him. See Note, 30 Ind. L.J. 487, 495-97 (1955). For a
discussion of the application of this statute see Montgomery, Federal Taxes 1'4 (37th ed.
1958); Spilky & Halprin, Embezzlers Have Tax Problems Too, 36 Taxes 798, 801-02 (1958).
" 366 U.S. at 220.52See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 16
